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1. Introduction 
Most studies of income distribution focus exclusively on cash income and neglect the impact of public 
services, although important services like education and health care in many countries are publicly 
provided for redistributive purposes. Smeeding et. al. (1993) suggest a possible explanation in the 
following statement: “The problems inherent in the measurement, valuation, and imputation of non-
cash income to individual households on the basis of microdata files are formidable.” Moreover, in 
most countries the scope for dealing with these problems is constrained by data limitations. As will be 
demonstrated in this paper the data limitations are less severe in countries that have established 
extensive register data systems. This is one reason why Norway emerges as an attractive country for 
studying the measurement of benefits from public services. A second reason is that Norway has a 
relatively large public sector where the municipalities are supposed to play a key role in the provision 
of public services. To this end the central government has introduced an equalization program for 
municipalities that aims at providing municipalities with equal opportunities to produce the same 
standard of public services. However, since the central government also makes transfers to 
municipalities for other purposes, like regional development, the opportunities may vary across 
municipalities. Moreover, local governments may exhibit different spending behavior that may result 
in different priorities over different services and over different households and individuals. For 
instance, some municipalities may give priority to education and child care services whereas others 
may focus on care for the elderly and disabled. Thus it is far from clear that the program for 
equalization payments reduces the inequality in the distribution of income in Norway. 
 
This paper provides an evaluation of how the local public in-kind benefits affect the distribution of 
income among individuals living in Norway. Thus, we have to deal with the problem of assessing the 
value of local public services and allocating the actual amounts on households and individuals. To deal 
with the former problem a method that accounts for differences between municipalities in capacity to 
produce the same standard of public services is required. To this end we propose to use an equivalence 
scale type of framework for measuring the magnitude of such differences. As far as we are aware of 
this is the first attempt to employ an equivalence scale approach to perform comparisons of benefit 
from public services across municipalities. The proposed method is derived from a model of spending 
behavior of local governments, where spending on different services is specified as a function of 
economic, social, demographic and geographic variables. 
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Application of the municipality equivalence scale introduced in Section 2 provides valuation of sector-
specific services that is comparable across municipalities. However, the problem of allocating the 
sector-specific amounts on recipients remains to be solved. Section 3 deals with this problem by 
treating services differently, depending on the justification of the services. One group of services may 
be considered to serve as insurance for certain subpopulations or the entire population. These services 
include health care, social care and care for the elderly and disabled. For these services methods that 
allocate the amounts in question on potential recipients are introduced. By contrast, the value of the 
production of education and child care is allocated uniformly on the families that receive these 
services. Empirical results for the distribution of municipal in-kind benefits between individuals are 
reported in Sections 4 and 5, whilst Section 6 deals with the distribution of extended income, defined 
as cash incomes after taxes plus municipal in-kind benefits. A brief conclusion is given in Section 7. 
2. The value of local government services 
The common approach in studies of the distribution of public services is to assume that the value of 
services equals the expenditures in service production, see Ruggles and O'Higgins (1981), Gemmell 
(1985), Smeeding et al. (1993) and Ruggeri et al. (1994). This means that in-kind transfers are treated 
similarly as cash transfers when this income component is added to private incomes in analyses of 
income distribution. A shortcoming of this approach is that it does not account for variation in prices 
per unit of output in the production of public services. 
 
By assuming that prices do not vary across municipalities, it follows that the choice sets are identical 
for two consumers with equal incomes (when there is no government regulation). With identical 
choice sets it makes sense to assume that the two consumers enjoy equal economic welfare.
1
 By 
contrast, if different consumers face different prices, then choice sets and economic welfare may differ 
even when incomes are equal. For many goods one may argue that competitive markets prevent large 
variation in prices, and that consumers are free to buy from those suppliers who offer the lowest price. 
However, this argument is less relevant for publicly provided goods. Usually recipients accept the 
services they are offered by public authorities. When expenditures are used as a measure of the value 
of local government service production, one has to assume that costs per unit of output are constant 
across regions. This assumption is quite restrictive, since regions differ with respect to economic, 
                                                     
1 Income is one of the primary goods in the theory of Rawls (1971). If the various institutional primary goods were equally 
supplied, then Rawls would call for equalizing the remaining one, which is income. This principle is criticized by Sen (1992), 
who argues that well-being is affected by human diversity and variation in capabilities. However, since there is little available 
information about the distribution of capabilities, this dimension is not included in our analysis. 
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demographic and geographic characteristics. For instance, one would expect that unit costs are 
affected by settlement patterns and economies of scale that vary across regions. 
 
Figure 1. Valuation of a publicly provided good with variation in unit costs 
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A situation with different unit costs for a publicly provided good is shown in Figure 1. There are two 
recipients, A and B, who receive quantities qA and qB of the publicly provided good. The recipients 
live in different municipalities, 1 and 2, with different production costs per unit of q, where unit costs 
are given by p1 and p2, respectively. The private incomes of A and B are assumed to be equal and 
given by x0. We also assume that the cash-equivalent transfers to A and B are equal and given by 
B2A10
qpqpxx ==− . Thus the sum x  of private incomes and individual-specific public 
expenditures is equal for A and B. However, as p1 > p2, municipality 1 produces less output for given 
expenditure than municipality 2. Therefore, qB > qA, and welfare is higher for B than for A. The effect 
of different prices is, however, ignored when the value of the publicly provided good is defined by 
public expenditure 
0
xx − . To accommodate this criticism it seems reasonable to define a common 
value per unit of q across municipalities, and we propose that valuation is based on the average unit 
cost )qq/()qpqp(p
BAB2A1
++= . It follows that the value of in-kind transfers is lower for A than for 
B. This is shown in the figure where total incomes including the value of services are given by xA and 
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xB. Note that this method ensures that aggregate income is equal to aggregate expenditure, i.e. 
x2xx
BA
=+ , although the valuation of services on the municipality level differs from the 
corresponding expenditure. 
2.1 A method for assessing variation in unit costs 
For the purpose of empirical application some difficulties arise when average unit costs are assumed to 
form the basis of the valuation of public services. The major problem arises from lack of adequate 
measures for public output. When output is unobserved, we are neither able to observe unit costs. 
However, in this paper we propose a method for estimating variation in unit costs for public services 
based on municipal expenditure data for different services combined with observations of local 
economic, social, demographic and geographic variables. The expenditure data are assumed to be 
generated from a model specified as a linear expenditure system (LES) with eight service sectors 
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where ui is per capita expenditure on service sector i, y is per capita exogenous income of the local 
government,
2
 the parameter
i
α  is called "subsistence expenditure", the parameter 
i
β  is the marginal  
budget share, and 
i
ε  is the random term for service sector i.
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Subsistence expenditures are defined to be the product of unit costs and subsistence output. To identify 
variation in unit costs, we assume that unit costs vary as functions of observable characteristics. For 
instance, unit costs for some of the municipal services are assumed to depend on whether or not the 
municipality is densely populated. Moreover, subsistence output is assumed to be affected by variables 
that describe the structure of demand or needs in the local population. For instance, subsistence output 
in primary education is supposed to increase with the population share of children in school age. 
While variation in unit costs implies that output is not directly affected, we assume that the subsistence 
output factors affect output, but not unit costs. Thus, the idea is that variation in unit costs is identified 
if we interpret the explanatory variables either as affecting unit costs or output. Although these 
                                                     
2 The major part of local government income in Norway is general grants-in-aid from the central government and local 
income taxes. The tax rate as well as the tax base is determined by the central government. For this reason both grants and 
taxes are treated as exogenous variables in the model. 
3 For further discussion of the model and its performance we refer to Aaberge and Langørgen (2003). 
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assumptions appear to be rather restrictive, the method is less restrictive than the standard approach, 
which ignores a possible variation in unit costs and presupposes that the introduced explanatory 
variables exclusively affect output. A more flexible modeling framework is obtained by allowing for 
the following parameter heterogeneity 
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where zi1 is a vector of variables that affect unit costs in service sector i, zi2 is a vector of variables that 
affect subsistence output in service sector i, and 
i1
α  and 
i2
α  are vectors of estimated parameters. 
The estimation results based on data for 1998 are reported in Appendix B. The parameter estimates 
prove to be consistent with the conventional wisdom of how the variables affect the expenditure 
profiles. 
 
The model includes the following service sectors 
 
1. Administration 
2. Education 
3. Child care 
4. Health care 
5. Social services 
6. Care for the elderly and disabled 
7. Culture 
8. Infrastructure 
 
An overview of the variables that affect unit costs and subsistence output in different service sectors is 
provided in Table 1. The estimated per capita subsistence expenditures in most service sectors are 
decreasing as a function of population size. This result is interpreted as evidence of economies of 
scale, which means that unit costs are higher in smaller municipalities. One important reason for 
variation in productivity is that smaller municipalities use a larger share of their economic resources 
on administration. This relationship is captured in the model by an index for small municipalities and 
inverse population size. For social services, however, the index for small municipalities is assumed to 
affect output and not unit costs, since a large part of social services are cash transfers (social 
assistance), and the value of output is consequently defined by expenditure. The explanatory variables 
in sector 5 are therefore assumed to affect output and not unit costs. 
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Local government infrastructure services (sector 8) in Norway include sewage disposal and snow 
clearing. Local variation in the requirements for sewage purification derives from national 
environmental regulations, and is assumed to affect unit costs in sewage disposal. Furthermore, the 
unit costs for keeping roads open are assumed to increase with the amount of snowfall during the year. 
 
Table 1. Variables affecting subsistence expenditures by type of variable and service sector 
Variable type Variable name Included in sector 
zi1 
Variables affecting unit 
costs 
Index for small municipalities 
Inverse population size 
Person hours (average traveling time) 
Population density 
Sewage purification degree 
Amount of snowfall 
Mentally disabled 7-15 years per capita 
Mentally disabled 16 years and above per capita 
1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 
1 
2, 4 and 6 
2 
8 
8 
2 
6 
zi2 
Variables affecting 
subsistence output 
Population share 0-5 years of age 
Population share 6-15 years of age 
Population share 67-79 years of age 
Population share 80-89 years of age 
Population share 90 years and above 
Children 0-5 years with lone mother/father per capita 
Unemployed 16-59 years per capita 
Divorced/separated 16-59 years per capita 
Foreigners from remote cultures per capita 
Dummy for urban municipalities 
Dummy for suburban municipalities 
Index for small municipalities 
Population density 
3 and 4 
2 
6 
4 and 6 
4 and 6 
3 
5 
5 
5 
5 
7 
5 
7 
Sector 1: Administration Sector 3: Child care Sector 5: Social care Sector 7: Culture 
Sector 2: Education Sector 4: Health care Sector 6: Care for the Sector 8: Infrastructure elderly  
          and disabled 
 
Higher dispersion of the local settlement pattern is found to increase subsistence expenditures in 
education, health care and care for the elderly and disabled. We assume that these effects are due to 
variation in unit costs. For instance, school and class sizes tend to be smaller in sparsely populated 
school districts, and this is interpreted as reduced productivity. In care for the elderly and disabled the 
traveling time of the staff between client homes decreases with density, which implies higher unit 
costs in sparsely populated areas. By contrast, the estimated positive relationship between municipal 
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expenditures on culture and population density is interpreted as higher supply and output in urban 
areas. Due to higher unit costs the observed local government expenditures are likely to overestimate 
the value of services in small and sparsely populated municipalities as compared to large and densely 
populated municipalities. 
 
As Smeeding et al. (1993) we regard output in health related services as an insurance benefit, which is 
received independently of the actual use of services. Public provision is thus compared to the 
alternative where citizens buy private insurance in the market. In this case output increases as a 
function of risk and coverage. Risk is described by the probabilities that residents with different 
characteristics become recipients, and coverage is described by the service standards that different 
types of clients can expect to receive. Since elderly people have a higher probability to become 
recipients of health related services than younger people, output is higher for elderly people (given the 
level of coverage). Thus it follows that the age structure affects output in health related services, which 
justifies the inclusion of these explanatory variables in subsistence output. For similar reasons the age 
structure affects subsistence output in child care and education as well. 
 
The population share of mentally disabled is a variable that includes actual recipients rather than 
potential recipients. Local government expenditure increases with the number of mentally disabled 
because this group is entitled to municipal care. The distribution of mentally disabled on 
municipalities is partly explained by the fact that some of the municipalities have been appointed as 
host communities for the mentally disabled. Thus, a high observed share of mentally disabled does not 
mean that the local community gives rise to a high risk of becoming mentally disabled. If we assume 
that the number of mentally disabled affects subsistence output, it follows that total output and welfare 
in the local community increase with the number of mentally disabled. By assuming that the number 
of mentally disabled affects unit costs the referred potential bias does not arise. The basic argument for 
this assumption is that the distribution of mentally disabled across municipalities is not related to the 
risk of becoming mentally disabled. 
 
The above discussion suggests the following valuation of services in sector i 
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where 
*
i
u  is the value of services in sector i, and 
1i
z  is the weighted average of the variables that 
affect unit costs.
4
 From (2.1) - (2.3) it follows that the value of local government service production in 
sector i equals 
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Thus, in assessing the value of sector-specific services, observed expenditures are adjusted for the 
difference between estimated unit costs and average unit costs. In municipalities with unit costs that 
are higher (lower) than average, the value of services is defined to be below (above) observed 
expenditures. This implies, for instance, that the imputed value of services for small and sparsely 
populated municipalities tends to be lower than the observed expenditure, and vice versa for large and 
densely populated municipalities. Equation (2.4) captures variation in the output that can be supplied 
for a given budget due to different local production possibilities. Thus, the adjustment in (2.4) can be 
viewed as analogous to the use of household equivalence scales for adjusting household incomes 
according to size and composition of the households. Note, however, that the proposed municipal 
equivalence scale depends on the income of the municipalities, in contrast to what is common for 
household equivalence scales.
5
 
 
In addition to the adjustment for variables that affect unit costs, expenditures are also adjusted for 
variation in the employers' social security tax rate, which is regionally differentiated in Norway. The 
value of services is computed for an average value of the tax rate. Moreover, the value of municipal 
in-kind benefits is calculated exclusive of user fees. The value of services produced by county 
governments (the intermediate level of government in Norway) and central government is not included 
in the analysis. Thus, since the capital city Oslo is both a county government and a local government, 
we have estimated the share of expenditures in Oslo, which is allocated to local government services. 
 
                                                     
4 The weights are equal to population shares for each municipality. 
5 An exception is provided by Aaberge and Melby (1998), who rely on LES to justify an income-dependent household 
equivalence scale. 
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Table 2.  Summary statistics for the ratio between the value of municipal services and 
expenditures by municipality size in 1998. Per cent 
Municipality size Number of 
municipalities 
Mean Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation 
Small: 0-4999 residents 245  80.6 59.5   94.8  5.7 
Medium: 5000-19999 residents 150  97.2 64.7 115.7  9.2 
Large: 20000 residents and above 40 107.6 95.9 113.1  3.1 
All municipalities 435  88.8 59.5 115.7 12.0 
 
The valuation of total service production in different municipalities is reported in table 2. The applied 
method ensures that the total value of services equals total expenditures for all municipalities. 
However, the estimated value of services may exceed or fall below expenditures on the municipality 
level. Table 2 shows that the valuation falls below the expenditure for small municipalities, whereas 
the valuation exceeds the expenditure for large municipalities. Note that the national average falls 
below 100 percent simply because municipalities with different population sizes are given equal 
weights, which means that weights per capita are higher in smaller municipalities. Valuated services 
vary between 59.5 percent and 115.7 percent of expenditures. 
3. Methods for allocating in-kind benefits on individuals 
The analysis in this paper relies on 1998 data for 4.4 million individuals, 2 million families and 435 
municipalities. The allocation of municipal in-kind benefits and user fees on families and individuals 
is based on six different data sources: 
• Local government accounts that provide sector-specific expenditures and fees at the municipality 
level 
• Demographic, social and geographic characteristics, which affect the subsistence expenditures of 
the municipalities and hence the valuation of services 
• Number of recipients of different services in each municipality by age and gender 
• Prices in kindergartens and care for the elderly and disabled reported by municipalities. Prices are 
reported for different family income levels 
• Register information on age, sex, family type, municipality, education level and private incomes 
for individuals (and families) 
• Data from sample surveys that provide information on the use of public services for individuals and 
families 
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The allocation of in-kind transfers on families and individuals is made stepwise in the following order: 
1. Selection of the recipients of different services 
2. Allocation of municipal in-kind benefits on the recipients 
3. Aggregation of in-kind benefits within each family 
4. Choice of family equivalence scales for different services 
5. Allocation of equivalent in-kind transfers on family members 
 
The two first steps differ between service sectors, and are discussed separately for each service sector 
in Appendix A. The third step consists of aggregating benefits over family members. The common 
approach in analyses of the personal income distribution is to assume that incomes are equally 
distributed within households or families. This assumption is simply a consequence of sparse 
information on the internal distribution of consumption within families. In the case of in-kind benefits, 
however, we know the primary recipients in different families. An alternative to in-kind transfers is to 
purchase similar services in the private market or to provide services as internal household production. 
For instance, parents may benefit from a reduction in household work when children are taken care of 
in kindergartens. Thus, it doesn’t seem plausible to assume that the primary recipients are the only 
beneficiaries. Therefore we apply the conventional assumption of equal distribution within families in 
the fifth step. 
 
Family equivalence scales are designed to adjust for differences in income needs for families of 
different sizes and composition, and thereby make incomes comparable across individuals. By 
adjusting each family's income by its equivalence scale, the distribution of incomes across 
heterogeneous families is converted into a distribution of (equivalent) incomes across individuals. To 
this end we will employ the class of equivalence scales introduced by Buhman et al. (1988) defined by 
S
a
 where S is the size of the family and a is the elasticity of the scale rate. To make incomes 
comparable the total income for each family is divided by the scale rate S
a
. Buhman et al. found that a 
wide range of scales in use, including the OECD scale, can be summarized quite well by this 
parametric family. The parameter a can take different values between 0 and 1. The value a=1 means 
that there are no economies of scale, while the value a=0 signifies the maximum degree of economies 
of scale, where the scale is constant and independent of the family size. Smeeding et al. (1993) assume 
that there are no economies of scale in non-cash income (in-kind transfers), and consequently specify 
a=1. Their study includes services like education, health care and housing. This assumption is 
common in most analyses of the incidence of government expenditure, although the choice of 
equivalence scale is rarely discussed. 
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It is plausible to assume that the services provided by local governments in Norway are private goods 
on the family level, but some of the services exhibit economies of scale within families. We assume 
that social care, care for the elderly and disabled and infrastructure exhibit economies of scale. All 
other services are treated as private goods within the family. For instance, cultural services like 
subsidies for sports activities are consumed individually by the family members and not shared within 
the family. By contrast, family members share the benefits from social services like child protection 
and alcohol abuse protection. If a father is violent or abusing alcohol, and if he is cured by treatment, it 
is plausible to assume that the benefits are larger the larger is the family, simply because there are 
more persons to benefit. Therefore, we assume that social care is shared as a public good within 
families, so a=0 for this sector. 
 
Care for the elderly and disabled includes nursing and assistance in household work. While the 
individual recipient consumes nursing, assistance in household work yields benefits, which are 
consumed in common by family members. For instance, if a public employee cleans the home, all 
household members derive a direct benefit. The benefit of each family member from having the home 
cleaned is not affected by the number of family members. Thus, care for the elderly and disabled is a 
mixture of private and public goods. Consequently we have chosen an intermediate value for the scale 
parameter, a=0.5. 
 
Infrastructure services include public roads, housing, water supply, and sewage and refuse collection. 
All these services are consumed commonly within the household. For instance, given the connection 
to water pipes, the marginal cost (and marginal user fee) for water in Norway is zero. Thus all 
household members may consume as much as they like, so the number of family members does not 
affect the benefit per person. Thus, we assume that infrastructure is shared as a public good within 
families, so a=0 for this sector. 
 
It remains to spell out the details of the two first steps. The first concerns identification of recipients 
while the second determines the allocation of the value of municipal services on recipients. For some 
services we identify a subgroup of the population as recipients. We use two different methods to 
identify such subgroups. The first method is direct identification from available data. Although this 
method may yield the highest possible level of precision, the data required for exact identification of 
recipients is normally not available for public services. However, primary education represents an 
important exception since primary schools are compulsory, which means that the subgroup of 
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recipients is almost identical to the population in the age-group 6-15 years. In this case age serves as a 
fairly accurate description of the recipients. 
 
When direct identification of recipients is impossible we may use available data to estimate the 
probabilities of being recipient for different socio-demographic subgroups of the population. These 
probabilities may vary as a function of age, sex, family type, education level, private income and 
municipality. The estimation of probabilities is based on data or estimates for the number of recipients 
in different population groups by municipality. When the population subgroups are defined by criteria 
that are relevant for the distributional policy of local governments, it is possible to approximate the 
distribution of services by random drawing of the correct number of recipients in each subgroup and 
for each municipality. Although the identity of the actual recipients is not revealed by this procedure, 
the method captures important features of the distribution of municipal services. Thus, to the extent 
that relevant characteristics of the recipients are taken into account, we are able to provide fairly 
precise approximations of the distributional profiles of these services. 
 
For some services, like health care and social care, we rely on the risk-related insurance benefit 
approach of Smeeding et al. (1993) by adopting the view that health care is an insurance benefit 
received by all coverees, independently of the actual use of services. However, the probability of 
receiving benefits is allowed to vary by age, gender and family type in line with differences in need. 
By contrast, allocating the value of health care on the actual recipients makes less sense, simply 
because the ill and disabled then will appear to have rather high welfare compared to those who are in 
good health. To be meaningful this approach requires that the direct welfare loss associated with 
illness and disability is taken into account. 
 
When the recipients have been selected by simulation, the value of services is distributed uniformly 
among the selected recipients. For instance, we do not account for different opening hours and staying 
time in kindergartens. Moreover, demand for culture is assumed to be constant for a given education 
level. However, when services are allocated according to the insurance benefit approach, which 
applies to health care, social care and care for the elderly and disabled, we assume that benefits are 
distributed in proportion to the probability of being recipient. Thus, the variation in in-kind transfers to 
persons derive either from variation in the probability of being recipient, or from variation in the 
economic situation and service sector priorities across local governments. 
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Table 3. Distribution of different municipal services as a function of individual characteristics 
 Age Sex Family 
type 
Education 
level 
Private 
income 
Administration      
Education x     
Child care x  x x  
Health Care x x    
Social care x    x 
Care for the elderly and disabled x x x   
Culture    x  
Infrastructure      
 
The detailed methods for selecting recipients and distributing the value of services are discussed for 
eight different service sectors in Appendix A. We combine estimates of probabilities of being recipient 
with the assumption of a distribution within municipalities that is uniform for selected recipients or for 
potential recipients with common characteristics. In administration, culture and infrastructure the 
probability of being recipient is equal to 1 for all citizens, while the probability varies with individual 
characteristics for all other services.
6
 The characteristics that are included in the analysis for different 
service sectors are shown in Table 3. 
4.  Distribution of in-kind benefits by age, family type and 
education level 
Based on the methods for valuation and allocation of services on individuals described in Sections 2 
and 3 we are able to examine the relationship between in-kind benefits and different socio-
demographic characteristics. Table 4 displays mean values of municipal in-kind benefits by age and 
service sector. The mean values for all age groups show that care for the elderly and disabled and 
education are the major service sectors. In-kind benefits are closely related to age in child care, 
education, care for the elderly and disabled, and social care. For other service sectors the impact of age 
on the distribution of benefits is modest. Due to the assumption that in-kind benefits are shared equally 
within families, we find that benefits in child care and education services are enjoyed by parents as 
well. Similarly younger persons who live together with elderly persons enjoy benefits from care for 
the elderly. Moreover, younger persons do also receive a personal insurance against the risk of 
disablement. However, the value of such insurance increases with age. As the results in Table 4 
                                                     
6 For culture we have estimated the average demand on each education level rather than the probability of being recipient. 
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demonstrate, total in-kind benefits are relatively low in the age-group 16-66 years. This is due to the 
fact that the basic local government services are primarily reserved for children and elderly. 
 
Table 4. Mean municipal in-kind benefits for persons by age and service sector, NOK 1998 
 0-5 
years
6-15 
years
16-66 
years
67-79 
years
80 years 
and above 
All age-
groups
Administration 1 800 1 800 1 800 1 800 1 800 1 800
Education 6 000 22 200 5 000 0 0 6 600
Child care 8 500 1 800 1 300 0 0 1 800
Health care 1 100 1 100 1000 1 300 1 200 1 100
Social care 1 800 1 700 2 000 400 300 1 700
Care for the elderly and disabled 1 400 1 500 2 500 22 900 92 400 8 100
Culture 1 400 1 400 1 400 1 300 1 200 1 400
Infrastructure 2 300 2 300 2 300 2 400 2 500 2 300
Total 24 400 33 800 17 500 30 100 99 400 24 800
 
The assumption of equal sharing of benefits within families implies that there are both a direct and an 
indirect effect of benefits on the members of the family. For instance, the value of education services 
received by a family depends on the number of children in school age in the family and is enjoyed by 
every family member. By contrast, if education services were privately provided then the family 
would have to finance the education of the children and all family members would suffer from a loss 
in income. 
 
Table 5. Mean municipal in-kind benefits for persons by age and family type, NOK 1998
* 
 0-5 years 6-15 years 16-66 years 67-79 years 80 years and above
Single without children - - 12 200 47 600 121 300
Single with children 30 100 39 500 22 100 - -
Couple without children - - 11 900 18 400 51 200
Couple with children 23 400 32 000 20 300 -                  - 
* - means that the group includes zero or few observations. 
 
Table 5 displays mean values of total municipal in-kind benefits by age and family type. The results 
show that mean in-kind benefits are particularly high for single elderly above 80 years of age. Recall 
that single elderly have a higher probability than married elderly to receive care for the elderly. 
Moreover, the single elderly do not share their benefits with younger family members. Persons without 
children receive particularly low in-kind benefits in the age-group 16-66 years, since such families are 
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not eligible for child care and education services. Children with a lone parent receive higher benefits 
than children in families of a couple with children. This is due to a higher probability of receiving 
child care for children 0-5 years with a lone parent. Moreover, the value of in-kind benefits is shared 
by more individuals in larger families. 
 
Table 6.  Mean municipal in-kind benefits for persons 30-39 years by education level and 
service sector, NOK 1998 
 Primary school or below Secondary school Higher education 
Administration  1 800  1 800  1 800 
Education 10 400 10 000  7 500 
Child care  1 800  2 800  5 300 
Health care  1 000  1 000  1 100 
Social care  2 600  2 100  1 900 
Care for the elderly and disabled  1 700  1 600  1 500 
Culture  1 200  1 300  1 700 
Infrastructure  2 300  2 300  2 300 
Total 22 800 23 000 23 000 
 
The education level in the population decreases with age and captures a cohort effect. Since a 
relatively high share of the elderly has lower education, we find that those with lower education on 
average receive quite high benefits from care for the elderly. In order to separate education and cohort 
effects, we have computed mean in-kind benefits for the age-group 30-39 years in Table 6. We find 
that those with higher education receive relatively low benefits from education and high benefits from 
child care. This is partly explained by the fact that the highly educated tend to postpone child bearing 
while taking their education, which means that they on average have younger children than those with 
lower education. Moreover, children of the highly educated have a relatively high probability to 
receive child care benefits when they are in preschool age. Benefits from social care decrease with the 
education level, since education and income is positively correlated, and higher income yields a lower 
probability to receive social care. Benefits from culture services, however, increase with the education 
level, as the highly educated use culture services more frequently. Although the average values of the 
different services vary by education level, the total in-kind benefits from local public services are 
almost constant across education levels for the age-group 30-39 years. 
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5. Inequality in the distribution of in-kind benefits 
The national distribution of in-kind benefits is affected by the central government's transfer program 
for municipalities as well as the spending behavior of local governments. Municipal incomes in 
Norway include grants-in-aid from the central government, local government taxes and user fees. Both 
the tax rate and the tax base for income taxes are determined by the central government. Thus, apart 
from user fees, the choice set for local governments is given exogenously as a function of total 
incomes and local unit costs. However, local governments have discretion to determine the 
distribution of in-kind benefits on service sectors, persons and families. Thus, the transfer program 
introduced by the central government may affect inequality between municipalities, whereas the 
spending behavior of local governments has an impact on the inequality within municipalities. 
5.1 Inequality between and within municipalities 
Inequality between municipalities arises when the per capita in-kind benefits differ between 
municipalities. The mean and inequality in the distribution of per capita in-kind benefits are reported 
in Table 7. Note that municipalities in the right tail of the distribution are in general small 
municipalities, which means that outliers are weighted more heavily when the standard deviation is 
computed on the municipal level rather than on the individual level. The within inequality component 
is measured by the Gini-coefficient for each municipality. A summary of the results is displayed in 
Table 7. The mean value of the Gini-coefficients equals 0.369, which suggests a rather high inequality 
compared to the inequality in the distribution of private incomes in Norway. 
 
Table 7.  Summary statistics for the mean and Gini-coefficient of the municipal-specific 
distributions of in-kind benefits, 1998 
 Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation 
Municipal per capita in-kind benefit (NOK) 27 000 15 500 123 400 9 800 
Gini-coefficient (Within inequality) 0.369 0.183 0.608 0.058 
 
Similar results by size of municipality are reported in Table 8, which shows that in-kind benefits are 
on average higher in small municipalities compared to medium and large municipalities. Inequality in 
the overall distribution of in-kind benefits is also slightly higher in small municipalities. 
 
For further analysis of the distribution between and within municipalities we utilize the following 
decomposition of in-kind benefits 
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where *jku  is the total value of municipal in-kind benefits for person k in municipality j, and 
*
ju  is the 
average in-kind benefit for persons in municipality j. In the computation of average in-kind benefits 
we have assumed no economies of scale at the family level. This component captures the remaining 
inequality when differences within municipalities are removed, and thus identifies the contribution to 
inequality that arises from variation in fiscal capacities and unit costs across municipalities.
7
 Inequality 
in the distribution of the internally equalized in-kind benefit is displayed in the last column of Table 8, 
and is found to be rather low compared to within as well as overall inequality. Decomposition of the 
Gini-coefficient by the two components in equation (5.1) shows that the between component 
contributes to only 5 percent of the inequality in the national population. However, for small 
municipalities the between component contributes to 15 percent of the inequality. Higher inequality 
among small municipalities is explained partly by high tax revenue from hydroelectric power plants in 
some of the small municipalities, and partly by the central government grant system, which 
discriminates between small municipalities depending on their geographical location. 
 
Table 8.  Population, average in-kind benefits, and Gini-coefficient for the distribution of in 
kind benefits on persons by municipality size, 1998 
Municipality size Population Mean in-kind 
benefits (NOK) 
Gini-coefficient 
(Overall inequality) 
Gini-coefficient 
(Between inequality)
Small: 0-4999 
residents 
626 528 26 900 0.405 0.144 
Medium: 5000-
19999 residents 
1 482 136 23 700 0.384 0.071 
Large: 20000 
residents and above 
2 308 779 24 900 0.393 0.058 
All municipalities 4 417 443 24 800 0.393 0.081 
 
5.2 Decomposition by service sector 
The priorities between different service sectors are largely affected by local government policies, but 
to some extent also by national regulations and the income level of different local governments. The 
priorities between different recipients within a given service sector are mainly determined by local 
bureaucratic officials. However, the detailed allocations are subject to national regulations and control 
                                                     
7 For an analysis of fiscal disparities between Norwegian municipalities, see Langørgen and Aaberge (1999). 
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by the local and national political system. Thus, the distribution of in-kind benefits is a complicated 
process, which involves several decision levels. However, it is useful to divide the decision process 
into two different stages. In the first stage priorities between service sectors are determined, while the 
second stage determines priorities within service sectors. To study the impact of the two stages on the 
distribution of in-kind benefits, we define total in-kind benefits as the sum of sector-specific in-kind 
benefits 
 
(5.2)  ∑
=
=
8
1i
*
i
*
uu , 
 
where u
*
 is total in-kind benefit. Note that subscripts for person and municipality are suppressed in 
equation (5.2), so 
*
i
u  is in-kind benefit in service sector i. As demonstrated by Rao (1969) the Gini-
coefficient (G) admits the following decomposition 
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where µµ /
i
 is the ratio between the means of 
*
i
u  and u
*
 respectively, which is denoted the factor 
share (or income share) of component i. The concentration coefficient 
i
γ  can be interpreted as the 
conditional Gini-coefficient of component i given the rank order in total in-kind benefit u
*
. The 
product of the income share and the concentration component is denoted the inequality contribution 
vi(G). The relative inequality contribution vi(G)/G is denoted the inequality share. 
 
Note that 
i
γ  is a measure of interaction between 
*
i
u  and u
*
. Assume for example that 0
i
>µ . Then a 
negative value of 
i
γ  expresses negative interaction, which means that component i gives an equalizing 
contribution to total inequality. A positive value of 
i
γ  expresses positive interaction, which means that 
component i gives a disequalizing contribution to total inequality. The case 0
i
=γ  corresponds to a 
situation where every person receives an equal amount of component i. Thus, component i gives a 
neutral contribution to total inequality. 
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Table 9.  Decomposition of the Gini-coefficient for the distribution of in-kind benefits by 
service sector 
 Inequality share Income share Concentration coefficient 
Administration 0.005 0.073 0.025 
Education 0.365 0.266 0.539 
Child care 0.090 0.072 0.487 
Health care 0.006 0.044 0.055 
Social care -0.000 0.070 -0.002 
Care for the elderly and disabled 0.499 0.326 0.601 
Culture 0.004 0.056 0.030 
Infrastructure 0.032 0.094 0.135 
 
The results for the decomposition of the Gini-coefficient for in-kind benefits by service sector in Table 
9 show that the two largest service sectors, education and care for the elderly and disabled, have high 
concentration coefficients as well as high inequality shares. Moreover, the concentration coefficient is 
also high for child care, although child care accounts for a minor share of total spending. Thus, the 
contributions from these three services are highly disequalizing and explain the high level of 
inequality in the distribution of municipal services. Administration, health care, social care, culture 
and infrastructure services are distributed more evenly across individuals. 
 
The indicated large inequality in the distribution of in-kind benefits - largely due to the contribution 
from basic welfare services like education and care for the elderly and disabled - is not necessarily in 
conflict with equalization policies that utilize local public in-kind transfers to redistribute welfare from 
rich to poor families. To discuss this issue the relationship between in-kind benefits and private 
incomes has to be taken into account. 
6. Inequality in the distribution of extended income 
Public in-kind benefits increase the economic welfare of the recipients. However, our knowledge of 
the relationship between in-kind benefits and private incomes and its impact on income inequality is 
rather limited. To study this subject it is helpful to introduce the term extended income, defined as 
private income after taxes plus the value of municipal services. To allocate private family incomes on 
individuals we rely on standard practice and assume that incomes are equally distributed within 
families. To account for scale economies in private incomes we follow Atkinson et al. (1995) and use 
the square root scale. 
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Table 10.  Mean value and Gini-coefficient for the distribution of extended income by 
municipality size 
 Small:
0-4999
Medium:
5000-19999 
Large: 20000 
and above 
All 
municipalities
Mean extended income (NOK 1998) 210 100 217 100 229 800 222 800
Gini-coefficient 0.192 0.197 0.236 0.218
 
The summary information for the distribution of extended income in Table 10 shows that the mean 
extended income is increasing with municipality size. Moreover, inequality in the distribution of 
extended income is increasing with municipality size. The inequality in the distribution of extended 
income is considerably lower than the inequality in the distribution of municipal in-kind benefits, see 
Table 8. To get a better understanding of the relationship between private incomes and public in-kind 
transfers, we will decompose the inequality in the distribution of extended income by the following six 
components 
 
1. Market incomes 
2. Social assistance 
3. National cash transfers 
4. Taxes 
5. Municipal user fees 
6. Municipal services 
 
Table 11.  Decomposition of the Gini-coefficient for the distribution of extended income by 
components of private incomes and the total value of municipal services 
 Inequality share Income share Concentration coefficient 
Market incomes  1.676  0.970  0.376 
Social assistance -0.012  0.005 -0.502 
National cash transfers -0.126  0.219 -0.102 
Taxes -0.530 -0.309  0.303 
Municipal user fees  0.003 -0.032 -0.017 
Municipal services -0.016  0.147 -0.019 
 
Market incomes include salaries, income from self-employment and capital incomes. Social assistance 
is separated from other public cash transfers, since local governments grant social assistance, while 
other cash transfers in Norway are provided by the national government. Municipal user fees are 
treated similarly as taxes, which means that municipal services as a component of extended income 
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include services that are financed by user fees. The results from the decomposition are displayed in 
Table 11. 
Market incomes are the dominating component, and have a clear disequalizing effect on the 
distribution of extended income. Since taxes are a negative income component, it follows from the 
positive concentration coefficient that taxes are equalizing. Social assistance and central government 
cash transfers are also equalizing, and more strongly for social assistance than for national cash 
transfers. Concentration coefficients that are close to zero indicate that user fees and municipal 
services have a neutral effect on the distribution of income, which means that the effect is similar to 
that obtained by an equal cash transfer to all citizens (corrected for economies of scale within 
families). Although we find large inequality in the marginal distribution of municipal in-kind benefits, 
the contribution from municipal in-kind benefits to inequality in the distribution of extended income is 
weakly equalizing or approximately neutral. The major conclusions from Table 11 are also valid for 
subpopulations formed by residents in small, medium and large municipalities. However, market 
incomes and taxes are relatively high in large municipalities, while factor shares for national cash 
transfers and the value of municipal services are high in small municipalities. For more details, see 
Appendix C. 
 
Table 12.  Decomposition of the Gini-coefficient for the distribution of extended income by total 
private disposable income and municipal service sectors 
 Inequality share Income share Concentration  
coefficient 
Private disposable income  1.010 0.853  0.258 
Administration  0.000 0.009  0.006 
Education  0.008 0.030  0.060 
Child care  0.000 0.011  0.004 
Health care -0.000 0.005 -0.016 
Social care -0.010 0.008 -0.276 
Care for the elderly and disabled -0.011 0.041 -0.057 
Culture  0.001 0.007  0.042 
Infrastructure  0.001 0.036  0.007 
 
Private disposable income is defined to be the sum of market incomes, social assistance and national 
cash transfers minus taxes and municipal user fees. The last component in Table 11 is municipal 
services, which can be further subdivided into components that represent different service sectors. 
Decomposition of the inequality in the distribution of extended income by total private disposable 
income and eight municipal service sectors is displayed in Table 12. The purpose is to analyze the 
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interaction between extended income and different municipal services. We find that the contribution 
from social care is equalizing. The value of care for the elderly and disabled is weakly equalizing, 
whereas the value of education and culture is weakly disequalizing. The contributions to income 
inequality from the remaining municipal service sectors are approximately neutral. Note that these 
contributions are rather different from the various sector-specific contributions to inequality in the 
marginal distribution of in-kind transfers. 
 
Table 13. Decomposition of decile-specific extended income by income components, NOK 1998 
 Market 
incomes
Social 
assistance 
National 
cash 
transfers
Taxes Municipal 
user fees
Municipal 
services 
Extended 
income
1. decile 33 400 4 000 52 400 -12 400 -6 400 30 000 101 000
2. decile 65 000 2 300 76 200 -24 800 -7 100 33 000 144 600
3. decile 109 800 1 600 63 700 -36 200 -7 400 34 000 165 500
4. decile 144 800 1 000 54 800 -45 100 -7 500 34 800 182 900
5. decile 175 300 700 48 800 -53 600 -7 500 35 200 198 900
6. decile 204 800 500 44 600 -62 600 -7 400 35 200 215 000
7. decile 236 500 400 41 300 -73 100 -7 200 34 800 232 800
8. decile 275 800 300 38 500 -86 800 -7 000 33 800 254 700
9. decile 338 300 300 34 300 -109 300 -6 500 30 200 287 300
10. decile 576 200 200 32 500 -184 900 -6 200 27 100 444 900
 
To provide more detailed information of the decomposition of the inequality in the distribution of 
extended income, mean values of different income components by decile are reported in Table 13. 
Extended income in the seventh column equals the sum of the six income components. The results 
show that market incomes and (the absolute value of) taxes increase with extended income, and social 
assistance decreases with extended income. National cash transfers increase from the first to the 
second decile, and decrease from the second to the tenth decile. Thus, it seems that the national 
welfare system only to a limited degree redistributes incomes to the 10 percent of the population with 
lowest incomes. 
 
The decile groups with medium extended incomes receive higher average values of municipal services 
and pay slightly more user fees than the lower and the higher decile groups. This means that municipal 
services are neither targeted towards the poor nor towards the rich; it is the middle-income groups that 
receive the highest in-kind benefits. The average value of municipal services is 30 percent higher in 
the fifth decile than in the tenth decile and 18 percent higher than in the lowest decile. 
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Table 14.  Value of municipal services by service sector in percent of total value of municipal 
services by deciles of extended income* 
Service sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 All
1. decile 6.3 9.8 5.0 4.0 16.1 27.6 4.7 26.5 100.0
2. decile 5.7 14.9 7.3 3.7 6.8 33.1 4.2 24.1 100.0
3. decile 5.6 19.2 7.8 3.5 5.4 30.4 4.3 23.6 100.0
4. decile 5.4 22.4 8.5 3.4 4.3 28.5 4.3 23.2 100.0
5. decile 5.4 23.7 8.6 3.3 3.7 27.8 4.4 23.0 100.0
6. decile 5.4 24.2 8.7 3.3 3.5 27.3 4.5 23.1 100.0
7. decile 5.5 24.0 8.3 3.3 3.3 27.4 4.6 23.5 100.0
8. decile 5.7 22.5 7.7 3.4 3.3 28.1 4.9 24.4 100.0
9. decile 6.4 20.9 7.1 3.7 3.7 25.3 5.6 27.2 100.0
10. decile 7.2 20.1 6.9 4.1 4.0 20.9 6.6 30.2 100.0
Sector 1: Administration Sector 3: Child care Sector 5: Social care Sector 7: Culture 
Sector 2: Education Sector 4: Health care Sector 6: Care for the Sector 8: Infrastructure elderly  
          and disabled 
 
The percent of valued municipal services that originates from different service sectors is reported for 
each decile group in Table 14. In the first decile social care accounts for a relatively high share of 
valued municipal services, which explains the equalizing contribution from social care that was found 
in Table 12. The low value of municipal services in the first, ninth and tenth decile groups in Table 13 
is first and foremost due to low benefits from education, child care and care for the elderly and 
disabled. These three services sectors account for shares of valued services that are first increasing for 
lower decile groups and then decreasing for higher decile groups. This means that the beneficiaries of 
these services, which are the elderly and families with children, account for a relatively high share of 
the middle-income groups. The elderly and families with children are not very prone to earn high 
(equivalent) incomes. Moreover, the welfare system in Norway includes age pensions, child benefits 
and municipal in-kind benefits, which reduce the frequency of low extended incomes among the 
elderly and families with children. For detailed results on the age composition of different income 
groups, see Table C.4 in Appendix C. The fact that the middle-income groups receive higher benefits 
from municipal services is supplementary to the main conclusion that the contribution from municipal 
services to income inequality is neither equalizing nor disequalising. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has considered the valuation of local public in-kind transfers and the distribution of 
benefits on families and individuals. In order to estimate the value of in-kind transfers, local 
government expenditures are adjusted for variation in characteristics that affect unit costs in service 
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production. The adjustment method is based on a structural model of local government behavior, and 
can be viewed as analogous to the use of household equivalence scales for adjusting household 
incomes according to size and composition of the households. 
 
The allocation of in-kind benefits on families and individuals for eight different service sectors is 
based on extensive register data systems for Norway, which are combined with household survey data 
and recipient statistics reported by local governments. The value of the production of education and 
child care is allocated uniformly on the families that receive these services. By contrast, the allocation 
of services like health care and care for the elderly and disabled is justified by an insurance benefit 
approach, which means that potential recipients derive benefits in proportion to their probability of 
becoming a recipient. For instance, the probability of receiving health care and care for the elderly is 
increasing with age, while the probability of receiving social care is decreasing with age. 
 
One of the main findings is that there is high inequality in the marginal distribution of municipal in-
kind benefits. The high inequality is to a large extent due to inequality in the distribution of in-kind 
benefits within municipalities, while the inequality between municipalities in average in-kind benefit 
for local residents is comparably low. The contributions from three service sectors (education, child 
care and care for the elderly and disabled) are highly disequalizing and explain the high level of 
inequality in the distribution of municipal services. 
 
To study interactions between the distributions of local public in-kind benefit and private income, we 
define extended income by private after-tax income plus the value of municipal services. Although the 
inequality in the distribution of municipal services is high, the contribution of municipal services to 
inequality in the distribution of extended income is approximately neutral. This result is explained by 
relatively low frequencies of poor and rich families that include children and elderly people. Thus, 
families that receive important municipal services like primary education and care for the elderly are 
more frequently located in the central part of the distribution of extended income. 
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Appendix A 
 
This Appendix spells out the detailed methods for selecting recipients and distributing the value of 
services on recipients in different service sectors. 
Administration 
The value of administration services and user fees are assumed to be distributed uniformly on all local 
residents within each municipality. This assumption is adopted since we have no data on the 
distribution of administration services. 
Education 
Local governments in Norway are responsible for 10 years of primary education. Secondary education 
is provided by county governments, and is not included in the analysis. The value of municipal 
education services and user fees are assumed to be distributed uniformly on all children in the age-
group 6-15 years. 
Child care 
There are both municipal and private kindergartens in Norway. Since local governments subsidize 
private kindergartens, they are included in the analysis of in-kind transfers. The population is ordered 
in subgroups according to the age of the children, family type and education level of the mother in the 
family (or the father if there is no mother). From summary statistics we know the number of children 
in kindergartens by age and municipality. For information on family type and education level we 
utilize a national survey, which includes 5000 families, where the type of child care is reported for 
each child. This information is used to estimate the total number of children in kindergartens by family 
type and education level. Thus we have information on the marginal distribution of children in 
kindergartens by age and municipality, and also the marginal distribution by family type and education 
level. The estimation of the simultaneous distribution by age, family type, education level and 
municipality is based on a log-linear model where the second-order interaction-component is equal to 
zero. The model is introduced by Birch (1963), and the maximum likelihood estimation method is 
called "iterative proportional fitting" or "raking". The estimation results show that the probability that 
children are taken care of in a kindergarten increases with the age in the interval from 0 to 5 years of 
age. Furthermore, the probability increases with the education level of the mother (father), and 
children with a lone parent have a higher probability than those with parents who live together. These 
results refer to averages, since the probability also varies across municipalities. 
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The population is divided into subgroups according to the four dimensions age, family type, education 
level and municipality, and from each subgroup the estimated number of children in kindergartens are 
selected by random drawing. Thus the four dimensions above are taken into account in the selection of 
recipients. For each municipality we assume that the assessed value of the child care services is 
distributed uniformly on the selected recipients. 
 
User fees in kindergartens are means tested against family gross income. The distribution of user fees 
is based on a sample of 105 municipalities, which have reported standardized charges for three 
different levels of family gross income. The data is used in a linear regression of charges on family 
income and local government income. The charges are found to increase with family income and 
decrease with local government income. The model is used to predict the charges for all children that 
have been selected as recipients. Thus predictions are made out-of-sample in the sense that 330 
municipalities are not included in the sample. Also the model is simulated with family income as a 
censored continuous variable, while charges are only reported for three different income levels in the 
sample. In the simulations family income is censored from below at 0, and from above at 375 000 
NOK, which is the highest level of charges reported in the sample. The predictions for each child is 
adjusted for the average rate of price reduction for brothers and sisters, and the predictions are 
calibrated against the sum of user fees reported in the local government accounts. 
Health services 
County governments or the central government run hospitals in Norway. However, general 
practitioners provide health services that are subsidized by local governments. These municipal health 
services are treated as insurance benefits in the analysis. For information on age and gender 
distribution of the patients we utilize a national survey that includes 5000 families. Respondents are 
asked whether or not they have visited a general practitioner in the last 14 days before the interview. 
This information forms the basis for estimating the age and sex specific probability of visiting a 
physician. The probability is found to increase with age for men, but not for women. Thus among 
younger adults women have a higher probability than men, but among the elderly men have a higher 
probability than women. The value of health care and user fees in each municipality is distributed on 
persons in proportion to their probability of being recipient. 
Social care 
Local governments provide social assistance, child protection and alcohol abuse protection. Since 
social assistance is defined as cash-transfers to poor families, these transfers are not included in our 
analysis of in-kind transfers. From the income data we know the distribution of social assistance on 
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persons and families, but the distribution of expenditures for child protection and alcohol abuse 
protection is not known. However, it is plausible to assume that the distribution of these in-kind 
benefits is similar to the distribution of social assistance. Thus, we have computed the probability of 
receiving social assistance in different income and age groups. The estimate of probability in a given 
subgroup is based on the frequency of social assistance for families within the subgroup. We find that 
the probability decreases with income and age. This probability is utilized to derive a distribution for 
social services in-kind. Each family receives a share of the value of social services in-kind, which is 
proportional to the probability of receiving social assistance. Consequently child protection and 
alcohol abuse protection are treated as insurance benefits. Everyone receive benefits, but poor families 
receive more than rich families, and elderly people receive less than young adults. We assume that 
families that are in the same income and age group (and in the same municipality) receive equal in-
kind benefits from social services. Recall that we use the equivalence scale parameter a=0 for social 
services, which means that all persons receive the same amount as the family to which they belong. 
User fees are distributed on families according to the same weights as in-kind benefits. 
Care for the elderly and disabled 
This service sector includes two types of recipients: Those who live at home, and those who live in 
institutions. In the distribution of in-kind transfers we do not separate between the two types of clients, 
since they are not treated separately in the local government accounts. From summary statistics we 
know the number of recipients by age group, sex and municipality. For information on family type we 
utilize a national survey, which includes 5000 families. This information is used to estimate the total 
number of elderly and disabled recipients by family type. Those who live in institutions are not 
included in the survey, so we assume that the patients in nursing homes are distributed on family types 
in proportion to the estimated probabilities of being a recipient of home-care for a given family type. 
 
Thus the available data provide information on the marginal distribution of recipients by age, sex and 
municipality, and also estimates of the marginal distribution by family type. The estimation of the 
simultaneous distribution by age, sex, family type and municipality is based on a log-linear model 
where the second-order interaction-component is equal to zero. The estimation results show that the 
probability of being recipient increases with age, and that the elderly women have a higher probability 
than elderly men. Furthermore, elderly who are single have a higher probability than elderly who are 
married. These results refer to averages, since the probability also varies across municipalities. 
 
While the selection of recipients in child care is based on random drawing, we use a different 
procedure in care for the elderly and disabled. Recall that the imputations in care for the elderly and 
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disabled is based on a risk-related insurance-benefit approach. First the estimates of the number of 
recipients in subgroups of the population by age, sex, family type and municipality are used to derive 
frequencies of recipients in each subgroup. These frequencies are used as estimates of the probability 
of being a recipient for different subgroups. The value of care for the elderly and disabled in each 
municipality is distributed on persons in proportion to their probability of being recipient. This means 
that all persons receive benefits, but the benefits vary as a function of the characteristics, which affect 
the probability of being a recipient, and also as a function of the economic situation and priorities of 
each local government. 
 
User fees in home-care and nursing homes are means tested against family income. Unfortunately we 
have no information on actual prices in nursing homes. Thus, we assume that user fees in nursing 
homes are proportional to user fees in home-care services. User fees in home-care for the elderly and 
disabled have been reported in a sample of 314 municipalities. These data show standardized charges 
for five different income groups, which cover different intervals of family taxable income. It is found 
that charges typically increase as a function of income. To derive estimates for all municipalities in 
Norway, we compute the average charge per month as a function of income group. The average charge 
is weighted by the probability of being recipient, based on estimates of probabilities as a function of 
age, sex, family type and municipality. This weighted average charge gives an estimate of the charge 
for each person, and after aggregation over persons within each municipality, we derive the share of 
charges paid by each person. Thus, the estimates are calibrated against the sum of user fees reported in 
the local government accounts. 
Culture 
Municipalities in Norway provide subsidies to cultural activities like sports, arts, museums, libraries, 
cinemas and churches. The frequencies of participation in the different types of activities are reported 
in a national survey, which includes 5000 households. To construct an index of demand for culture by 
different respondents, the rates of participation in different activities are weighted by total municipal 
expenditures for each activity. The respondents are divided in groups according to education level 
(low, medium and high), and the average index of demand is computed for each education level. It is 
found that average demand is increasing with the education level. The value of cultural services in 
each municipality is distributed on persons in proportion to the average demand by different education 
levels. All persons in a given family receive in-kind transfers, which are determined by the education 
level of the person with the highest education level in the family. For a given education level and a 
given municipality the in-kind transfer is constant for all persons. Since we have no information on 
participation in cultural activities on the municipal level, we do not account for variation in demand 
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between persons with the same education level. User fees are distributed on persons according to the 
same weights as services. 
Infrastructure 
Infrastructure services include public roads, housing, water supply, and sewage and refuse collection. 
For these services we assume that in-kind transfers and user fees are distributed uniformly on families. 
Thus, for a given municipality, each family receives the same transfer. Since the equivalence scale 
parameter a=0 for this sector, it follows that all persons in a given municipality receive the same 
benefit. However, there are variations in the individual benefits across municipalities. 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B. Estimates of parameter heterogeneity for subsistence expenditures, 1998* 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0,47
(4,28)
-0,65
(1,39)
-0,56
(1,98)
0,05
(0,15)
0,58
(5,12)
-0,39 
(1,03) 
0,47 
(4,41) 
0,15
(0,56)
Population share 0-5 years of age 16,68
(4,62)
1,25
(0,37)
  
Population share 6-15 years of age 37,57
(10,20)
  
Population share 67-79 years of age 8,39 
(5,23) 
 
Population share 80-89 years of age 1,50
(0,59)
31,88 
(5,23) 
 
Population share 90 years and above 1,50
(0,59)
167,9 
(5,14) 
 
Children 0-5 years with lone 
mother/father per capita 
16,87
(2,04)
  
Mentally disabled 7-15 years per capita 181,3
(2,16)
  
Mentally disabled 16 years and above 
per capita 
476,7 
(51,58) 
 
Foreigners from remote cultures per 
capita 
20,71
(4,01)
  
Divorced/separated 16-59 years per 
capita 
9,02
(4,84)
  
Unemployed 16-59 years per capita 8,20
(1,57)
  
Person hours (average traveling time) 1,93
(7,32)
0,58
(5,60)
0,95 
(2,30) 
 
Population density -0,83
(3,33)
 0,05 
(0,40) 
Dummy for urban municipalities 0,33
(3,61)
  
Dummy for suburban municipalities  -0,08 
(1,31) 
Index for small municipalities 0,88
(4,40)
1,56
(4,65)
0,58
(3,04)
0,63
(3,96)
-0,34
(3,39)
1,47 
(3,51) 
 1,54
(3,84)
Population inverted (thousands) 1,15
(8,24)
  
Sewage purification degree   0,57
(3,51)
Amount of snowfall (meters)   0,09
(1,74)
R2 0,84 0,77 0,59 0,62 0,43 0,86 0,62 0,75
* The dependent variables are per capita expenditures in eight different service sectors. Thousands of Norwegian kroner are 
used as unit of measurement. T-statistics are in parentheses. Number of observations = 426. 
Sector 1:  Administration Sector 5:  Social services 
Sector 2:  Education Sector 6:  Care for the elderly and disabled 
Sector 3:  Child care Sector 7:  Culture 
Sector 4:  Health care Sector 8:  Infrastructure 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C.1. Decomposition of the Gini-coefficient for the distribution of extended income in small 
 municipalities* 
 Inequality share Income share Concentration 
coefficient 
Market incomes  1.666  0.899  0.356 
Social assistance -0.006  0.003 -0.342 
National cash transfers -0.179  0.237 -0.145 
Taxes -0.477 -0.271  0.337 
Municipal user fees  0.007 -0.035 -0.036 
Municipal services -0.011  0.167 -0.013 
* The table includes the population in 245 municipalities where each has less than 5 000 residents. 
 
 
Table C.2. Decomposition of the Gini-coefficient for the distribution of extended income in 
 medium size municipalities* 
 Inequality share Income share Concentration 
coefficient 
Market incomes  1.726  0.962  0.353 
Social assistance -0.009  0.004 -0.463 
National cash transfers -0.180  0.219 -0.161 
Taxes -0.520 -0.299  0.342 
Municipal user fees  0.005 -0.030 -0.035 
Municipal services -0.022  0.145 -0.030 
* The table includes the population in 150 municipalities where each has between 5 000 and 20 000 residents. 
 
 
Table C.3. Decomposition of the Gini-coefficient for the distribution of extended income in large 
 municipalities* 
 Inequality share Income share Concentration 
coefficient 
Market incomes 1.651 0.992 0.393 
Social assistance -0.014 0.006 -0.541 
National cash transfers -0.099 0.214 -0.109 
Taxes -0.534 -0.325 0.387 
Municipal user fees -0.001 -0.031 0.003 
Municipal services -0.003 0.144 -0.005 
* The table includes the population in 40 municipalities where each has 20 000 residents or more. 
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Table C.4. Percent of population in different age and family groups by deciles of extended 
 income, 1998 
Age 0-5 6-15 16-66 67-79 
80 and  
above 
Total
Family type*  Single Couple Single Couple  
1. decile 7.6 5.7 48.5 14.9 8.5 11.1 3.7 100.0
2. decile 9.4 9.6 29.0 21.5 11.3 14.8 4.4 100.0
3. decile 10.3 12.6 28.4 27.2 8.4 8.6 4.5 100.0
4. decile 10.7 15.1 24.4 34.0 5.0 5.7 5.2 100.0
5. decile 10.3 16.0 21.1 39.7 3.1 4.2 5.7 100.0
6. decile 9.5 16.3 17.3 46.2 2.1 3.3 5.4 100.0
7. decile 8.3 15.9 14.0 52.7 1.4 2.8 4.9 100.0
8. decile 6.8 14.3 11.5 59.7 1.0 2.4 4.4 100.0
9. decile 5.2 11.8 10.0 67.6 0.7 2.0 2.6 100.0
10. decile 4.4 10.1 9.1 72.4 0.6 2.1 1.2 100.0
All 8.3 12.7 21.3 43.6 4.2 5.7 4.2 100.0
* Lone mothers and fathers are included in the family type of singles. 
 
 
 
